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[L.A.. No. 29434. In Bank. May 27, 1968.] 
AMERICAN SAVINGS AND LOAN ASSOCIATION, Plain-
tiff and Appellant, v. MARTIN N. LEEDS, Defendant 
and Respondent. 
[la,lb] Trust Deeds-Remedies-Pleadings.-In a suit by a pur-
chase money trust deed beneficiary against the trustor to 
recover the entire amount of its loan and to subject to a trust 
in its favor funds received by the trustor in settlement of a 
suit against his vendors for damages for misrepresentation as 
to the land sold, the court correctly concluded that plaintiff had 
failed to state a cause of action, where plaintiff's damage was 
caused by the fraud of the vendors in inducing it to lend money 
on the basis of inadequate security, rendering inapplicable 
repair and restoration obligations of the trustbr under the 
trust deed, and where ·the amount received by the trustor in a 
separate settlement with his vendors was for, and not alleged 
to be more than, his personal economic loss, rather than for 
damages for injury to the property, rendering inapplicable 
trust deed provisions as to plaintiff beneficiary's right to any 
award for physical damage to the property. 
[2] Id.-Sale Under Power-De1iciencY.-Code Civ. Proc., § 580b, 
prohibits any deficiency judgment after the sale of real 
property under a purchase money mortgage or deed of trust 
and places the full risk of inadequate security on the purchase 
[2] See Cal.Jur.2d, Mortgages and Trust Deeds, §§ 440, 472; 
Am.Jur., Mortgages (1st ed § 857 et seq). 
McX. Dig. References: [1] Trust Deeds, § 48(1); [2] Trust 
Deeds, § 95(2) (e). 
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money lender; thus to require a trustor to correct a condition 
of the property existing at the time of sale to him, and to repair 
the damage to the improvements caused by that condition, 
would shift to the trustor one of the risks that Code Civ. 
Proc., § 580b, requires the purchase money lender (trust deed 
beneficiary) to bear. 
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los 
Angeles County. Carlos M. Teran, Judge. Affirmed. 
Action against the buyer of a house on which plaintiff had 
a trust deed for settlement money resulting from suit for 
damages by buyer against seller when land subsided and made 
house uninhabitable. Judgment of dismissal after demurrer to 
the second amended complaint was sustained without leave to 
amend affirmed. . 
A. Joseph Sherwood and Richard D. Dreyfus for Plaintiff 
and Appellant. 
Bolton, Groff & Dunne and Gene E. Groff for Defendant 
and Respondent. 
TRAYNOR, C. J.-Plaintiff appeals from a judgment of 
-
dismissal as to defendant Martin N. IJeeds after his demurrer ' .. --.. 
to the second amended complaint was sustained without leave 
to amend. 
In its second amended complaint, plaintiff sought to state 
separate causes of action against defendants Mr. and Mrs. 
Sheridan and defendants Mr. and Mrs. Leeds. In its first 
cause of action it alleged that in 1962 the Sheridans sold their 
home to the Leeds for $122,500. The Leeds borrowed $85,000 
of the purchase price from plaintiff, giving their note secured 
by a first deed of trust. The Sheri dans knew that their house 
and other improvements were built on improperly filled and 
compacted soil, the subsidence of which had caused cracking 
and separating of various parts. of the house and other 
improvements. Before the sale the Sheridans concealed and 
camouflaged these defects by painting, plastering, and decora-
ting, and when plaintiff's agent inspected the property to 
determine whether it was suitable security, the Sheridans 
falsely represented that the house was built on unfilled land. 
In reliance on these representations plaintiff lent the Leed~ 
$85,000, which was paid to theSheridans. on the' close of 
escrow. Owing to the soil condition, the property was of little 
or no value and would not qualify as security for a loan, and 
j 
) 
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after the sale further subsidence caused the house to become 
unihabitable and the security became" worthless or of little or 
no value." Plaintiff sought to recoyer general damages of 
$85,000 plus interest and punitive damages of $50,000 from 
the Sheridans. 
In its second cause of action plaintiff incorporated the alle-
gations of the first. It also set forth the deed of trust executed 
by the Leeds and alleged that the Leeds had sued the Sheri-
dans for damages caused by the condition of the property and 
settled their action for an amount unknown to plaintiff. 
Plaintiff sought to hold the Leeds liable for its entire alleged 
loss of $85,000 on the theory that the Leeds' failure to keep the 
property in good condition and repair destroyed plaintiff's 
security. It also sought to impose a trust in its favor on the 
amount the Leeds received in settlement from the Sheridans. 
Although Mrs. Leeds was named as a party defendant, it 
does not appear whether she was served or appeared. From 
the file in the action by the Leeds against the Sheridans. 
which was incorporated by reference in plaintiff's complaint, 
it appears that the Leeds are divorced and that, pursuant to a 
property settlement, Mrs. Leeds quitclaimed her interest in 
the property involved to Mr. Leeds and assigned to him her 
interest in the Leeds action against the Sheri dans. Accord-
ingly, Mr. Leeds appeared individually in this action. After 
his demurrer was sustained without leave to amend, the action 
was dismissed as to him. We will hereafter refer to him as 
defendant. 
Plaintiff invokes two provisions of the deed of trust to 
establish defendant's liability. "To Protect the Security of 
This Deed of Trust," defendant agreed "(1) To keep said 
property in good condition and repair, not remove or demolish 
. any buildings thereon; [and] to complete or restore promptly 
and in good and workmanlike manner any building which 
may be constructed, damaged or destroyed thereon. . . ." He 
also agreed that" (9) Any award of damages in connection 
with any condemnation for public use of or injury to said 
property or any part thereof is hereby assigned and shall bc 
paid to Beneficiary [plaintiff] who may apply or release such 
moneys received by [it] in the same manner and with the 
same effect as above provided for disposition of proceeds from 
fire or other insurance. " 
It is unnecessary to decide whether the one-form-of-actioll 
) 
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provision of section 726, Code of Civil Procedure! or an anal-
ogous common law rule precludes enforcing either of these 
provisions except as incident to a foreclosure (see Lavenson v. 
Standard Soap Co. (1889) 80 Cal. 245, 247-248 [22 P, 184, 13 
Am.St.Rep. 147] ; Rced Of'chard 00. v. Supcri{)r Court (1912) 
19 Cul.App. 648. 665 [128 P. 9, 18]; Rose v. Oonlin (1921) 52 
Cal.App. 225, 231 [198 P. 653]; Osborne, Mortgages (1951) 
§ 128, p. 319, § 136, p. 334; cf. Mills v. Brown (1928) 205 Cal. 
38, 40 [269 P. 636]), or upon pleading and proof that the 
Neeurity is valueless. (See Roseleaf Cm'p. v. Ckierigkino 
(1963) 59 Ca1.2d 35, 39 [27 Cal.Rptr. 873, 378 P.2d 97] and 
cases cited.) Neitller of the provisions of the deed of trust 
invokcd by plaintiff is applicable to the facts pleaded. 
[Ia] The damage to the property did not result from any 
act of defendant or others occurring after the sale.2 It was 
l"There can. be but one form of action for the reeovery of any debt, 
or the enforcement of any right secured by mortgage upon real property, 
which action must be in accordance with the provisions of this chapter." 
2Plaintiff's authorities deal primarily with such distinguishable wrongs. 
Since "The most important single aspect of a mortgage relationship is 
the subjection of thc mortgaged premises to sale and the application of 
tbe proceeds of such sale to the satisfaction of the underlying obliga-
tion" (3 Powell (Rohan cd. 1967) Real Property, 1451, p. 613), a 
mortgagee out of possession has legal remedies to compensate for damages 
suffere(l to the:seeurity lit the hands of others. He may sue the mortgagor 
for waste. (Civ. Code, § 2929; Taubcufeld, nights and Remedies Other 
Tllllu l'orecl09ul'e, California L:l11d Security and Development (Cont. 
Ed. Bar, 1960) § 3.29; Osborne, Mortgages, supra, § 128. 1 Glenn, Mort-
gnges (1943) § 34.) lIe may sue third persons for tortiously damaging the 
IIccurity_ (Taubenfeld, op. cit. supra, § 3.31; Loa Angeles Tntst go Sal'. 
Balik v. Bortc11.8tcin (1920) 47 Cal.App. 421, 423-425 [190 P, 850]; 
Osborue, OIl. cit. supra, § 129; Glenn, op. cit. supra, § 34.) He may assert 
rights in the proceeds from eminent domain proceedings that took part of 
the security. (Taubenfeld, op. cit. supra, § 3.33; Sacramento etc. Drainage 
Dikt. v. Truslow (1954) 125 Cal.App.2d 478 [270 P.2d 928, 271 P.2d 930].) 
W'lwn a third person tortiously damages the property, both the mortgagor 
and mortgagee mllY sue the third party tortfeasor. If the mortgagor Bues 
first, he may recover the total amount of damage to tbe property, but the 
fund recovcred is subject to the lien of the mortgagee to the amount that 
his security lIas been damaged. (Los Angeles Trust ~. Sav. Bank v. Borten-
IIlein, IfItpm, 47 CII1.App. 421,424; Elvins v. Delaware 4- Atlantio Tel. ~. 
2'd. Co. (lH9V) 63 N.J.!.. 243, 24!i-246 [43 A. 903, 76 Am.St.Rell. 217]; 
Garrow v. Brooks (1938) 123 N.J. J~q. 138, 140 [196 A 460]; Osborne, 
up. cit. supra, § 133.) 
'fhe theory upon which all these remedies rest is one of equitable cou-
,·er .. ion or substituted property: "[T]be money 80 awarded by the court 
:IS damages to the realty must be treatecl, in equity, as the land itself. 
It takes the III ace of the reduced value of the land. The mortgaged land, 
in its present damaged coudition, togetlle1' witb sucb portion of all the 
1II0Jl('YS nwa1'dc<l for the total ill.iury as represents. the damage to tll0 
mortgaged premises, stand now in the place and stead of the original 
Ilninjured mortgaged premises." (Los Angelea Tntst ~. Sav. Bank v. 
Bortenstein, supra, 47 Cal.App. 4~I, 424.) 
If plaintiff were attempting to reach substitute property, it could do 
80 without being barred by section 580b of the Code of Civil Procedure. 
) 
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caused by the failure properly to compact the fill before the 
house and improvements were constructed. As a result thc 
property was worth substantially less at the time of tIle sale 
than plaintiff and defendant believed it to be worth. Each was 
damaged by the fraud of the vendors, plaintiff by lending 
money on the basis of inadequate security and defendant by 
paying the remainder of the purchase price. Neither plaintiff 
nor defendant may properly shift his loss to the other. 
Even if defendant's agreement to "keep said property in 
good condition and repair" and to "restore ... any bund-
ing which may be . . . damaged or destroyed tllereon" could 
reasonably be interpreted to include an obligation to correct 
the improper fill condition and repair all physical damagc 
caused thereby, section 580b3 of the Code of Civil Proccdure 
would preclude giving effect to that interpretation. [2] Sec-
tion 580b prohibits any deficicncy judgment after the salc 
of property under a purchase money mortgage or deed of 
trust and places the full risk of inadequate security on the 
purchase money lender. (Bargioni v. Hill (1963) 59 Ca1.2d 
121, 123 [28 Cal.Rptr. 321, 378 P.2d 593] ; Roscleaf v. Chief·i-
ghino, supra, 59 Cal.2d 35, 42; B1·own v. Jensen (1953) 41 
Ca1.2d 193, 197-198 [259 P.2d 425].) To require defendant to 
correct the condition of the property existing at the time of 
the sale and to repair the damage to the improvements caused 
by that condition would shift to him one of thc risks that 
section 580b requires plaintiff to bear. 
[Ib] Clause (9) of the deed of trust refers to any" award 
of damages in connection with any condemnation for public 
use of or injury to" the property and is arguably limited to 
(See fn. 3, infra.) That section prohibits a deficiency judgment when a 
mortgage or deed of trust secures the payment of purchase money on 
real property, but it does not prohibit mortgagees from preventing mort-
gagors or third parties from physically harming the security or from 
recovering damages for such harm. Such a recovery is not a deficiency 
judgment. (LOB .Angeles Trust tf Sav. Ban7c v. Bortenstein, Bupra, 47 
Cal.App. 421, 424.) Since the purchase money lender is confined to his 
security, it is all the more important that he be allowed effectively to 
protect it. 
sIINo deficiency judgment shall lie in any event after any sale of real 
property for failure of the purchaser to complete his contract of sale, 
or under a deed of trust, or mortgage, given to the vendor to secure pay-
ment of the balance of the purchase price of real property, or under a 
deed of trust, or mortgage, on a dwelling for not more than four families 
given to a lender to secure repayment of a loan which was in fact used to 
pay all or part of the purchase prie.e of such dwelling occupied, entirely 
or in part, by the purchaser." (As amcnded in 1963. The uJuendmcnt 
is not relevant in this ease.) 
) 
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condemnation awards for taking or damaging property. Even 
if it also includes an award for physical damages to property 
inflicted by a private tortfeasor, it does not include the settle-
ment defendant made with the Sheri dans as vendors. Defend-
ant's action against the Sheridans was not for injury to the 
property but for the Sheri dans ' fraudulent or negligent 
wrong in inducing defendant to purchase the property. By 
the time of the sale, the improper compacting of the fill had 
already manifested itself by causing physical injury to the 
property. In his action against the Sheri dans, defendant 
sought damages or rescission on theories of fraudulent mis-
representations, fraudulent concealment, negligent misrepre-
sentations, and negligent construction. We do not know 
which, if any, of thcse bases for imposing a duty on the Sheri-
dans defendant might have established had the case gone to 
trial. It is clear, however, that the gravaman of his action was 
to recover, not damages for physical injury to the property, 
but the economic loss he suffered by being induced to buy 
property that was worth substantially less than the purchase 
price. Recovery for such a personal loss to defendant as ven-
dee is not one for damages for injury to the property that 
plaintiff may claim as a substitute for its security. 
Plaintiff points out, however, that defendant sued the Sher-
idans not only for his own damages but to recover the full 
purchase price of the property. It therefore contends that the 
settlement must be deemed to include plaintiff's loss and be 
subject to the lien of its deed of trust. We have no doubt that 
had the Sheridans settled with and paid to defendant the full 
purchase price of the property, plaintiff would be entitled to 
impose a constructive trust to the extent of its debt on that [ 
settlement. Even though such a settlement would not have 
been binding on plaintiff in its own action against the Sheri-
dans, it would reflect an intention of the Sheridans to correct 
any wrong they might have committed in the sale of the prop-
erty. It could not be assumed that in paying full damages to-
defendant they intended other than a complete settlement. In 
such case plaintiff could properly claim recompense on the 
theory that the Sheri dans had mistakenly paid money to 
defendant that properly SllOUld have been paid to plaintiff. 
(Civ. Code, §§ 2224, 3521, 3529; Rest., Restitution, § 160; 
Ward v. Taggart (1959) 51 Cal.2d 736, 741-743 [336 P.2d 
534].) 
At no time, however, has plaintiff alleged that defendant 
r~eived more in settlement from the Sheridans than his own 
1 
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damages.' In sustaining demurrers to plaintiff's complaints, 
the trial court pointed out that plaintiff was seeking to reach 
a settlement that appeared to be personal to defendant, and 
only after plaintiff's third attempt to state a cause of action 
against defendant, did the court sustain the demurrer without 
leave to amend. No abuse of discretion appears, and the court 
correctly concluded that plaintiff had failed to state a cause 
of action against defendant. 
The judgment is affirmed. 
McComb, J., Peters, J., Tobriner, J., Burke, J., and Sulli-
van, J., concurred. 
MOSK, J.-J dissent. 
This is not a suit upon a secured debt, but a suit to prevent 
security from being impaired. (Mills v. Brown (1928) 205 
Cal. 38 [269 P. 636].) The deed of trust signed by the defend-
ant provided he was "to protect the security." Specifically 
he agreed" (1) To keep said property in good condition and 
repair, •.. to complete or restore promptly and in good and 
workmanlike manner any building which may be constructed, 
damaged or destroyed thereon .... " (Italics added.) 
To permit the defendant to appropriate to his own use a 
cash fund a part or all of which he received because third 
parties "constructed, damaged or destroyed" the building 
. which constituted the security does violence to the intent of 
the foregoing trust deed provision. The defendant had a clear 
duty to restore promptly the building to good condition. Since 
he received funds and has failed to use them for the agreed 
purpose, it is not inappropriate to impress the funds with a 
lien or trust (Civ. Code, § 2224). 
It is true that we do not now know, nor does plaintiff, how 
much of the settlement between defendant and the Sheridans 
was attributable to damage to the security property and how 
much was for the Sheridans' tortious conduct in the nature of 
fraud and deceit. But it must be remembered that this case 
was decided at the pleading stage. The plaintiff alleged that 
defendant sued the Sheridans for damage to the land and 
improvements and subsequently settled the claim; the demur-
rer admits the allegations. Despite this admission that defend-
'Both defendant and the Sheridans sueeessfully resisted plaintiff's 
intervt'ntion in defendant's suit aguinst the Sheridans. Having thu8 
undertaken to meet plaintiff separately, it seems extremely unlikely that 
the Slleridans would have exposed themselves to the risk of paying the 
lame damages twice by including in their settlement with defendant any 
damages that plaintiff might properly claim. 
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ant received money for damage to the security, the plaintiff 
was not permitted to maintain his prima facie cause of action 
and then to ascertain, through defendant's answer, discovery 
and ultimate trial, the precise nature of the settlement. 
The court below apparently examined the complaint in the 
defendant's suit .against the Sheridans and concluded that it 
sounded exclusively in tort. However, tlle court failed to con-
sider tIle pretrial contentions, in which defendant demanded 
of the Sheridans not merely the sums he had himself 
expended, but the full purchase price of $122,500, including 
the $85,000 borrowed from plaintiff company. As to the 
$85,000 or any part thereof ultimately recovered, it seems 
irrefutably clear that the defendant would necessarily be a 
constructive trustee for plaintiff. The Sheri dans in their pre-
trial statement maintained that the $85,000 loan be excluded 
from the damage claim against them. In that manner the 
issues were joined and subsequently settled. 
Nevertheless the defcndant has insisted that his action 
against the Sheridans was merely for a personal tort and 
unrelated to property damage to the security. I find it of 
particular relevance that the defendant sought as damages in 
his prayer in that prior lawsuit thc exact amount of the pur-
chase price. It would be a remarkable coincidence if damage 
for fraud and dcceit he purportedly suffered equalled to the 
penny the value of the security property. Thus even beyond 
the technical admission of facts al1eged in the complaint 
which a demurrer is deemed to be, a conclusion is inescapable 
that some part of the defendant's settlement with the Sheri-
dans was attributable to damage to the security property. In 
that event, as stated in Los Angeles Trust & Sav. Bank v. 
Bortenstein (1920) 47 Cal.App. 421, 424 [190 P. 850], the 
money "takes the place of the reduced value of the land" 
and is subject to a constructive trust. 
Although the majority hint some future action might lie, 
for the present they permit the defendant to effectively escape 
his responsibility to the plaintiff to keep the security intact, 
and they allow him to retain the entire fund received from the 
third parties some part of which was obtained because of 
damage to the sccurity. 'l'his is unjust enrichment. 
The complaint stated a cause of action. It was error to 
sustain the demurrer without leave to amend. I would reverse 
the judgment. 
Appellant's petition for a rehearing was denied June 26, . 
1968. Mosk, J., was of the opinion that the petition should be 
granted. 
--1 
